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Censoring the Press: A Barometer of 
Government Tolerance for Anti-regime 
Dissent under Authoritarian Rule 
Elizabeth Ann Stein 
Abstract: This paper proposes that dissident leaders aiming to build 
mass opposition movements follow the mainstream press to help them 
gauge government tolerance for anti-government mass actions in repres-
sive authoritarian regimes. Under conditions of censorship, media–state 
interactions serve as a barometer of the government’s disposition toward 
and capacity to impede public displays of dissent. Observing trends in 
coverage and the government’s reaction to this coverage helps activist 
leaders assess when it should be safest to plan anti-government mass 
actions, such as demonstrations, marches, or strikes. Using original data 
derived from coding content from the Brazilian newspaper Folha de São 
Paulo over the period of 1974–1982, I test whether opposition mass 
actions followed trends in taboo content and government treatment of 
the press during the period of political liberalization of Brazil’s military 
regime. 
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1 Introduction 
Since Dilma Rousseff began her second term as president on 1 January 
2015, hundreds of thousands of citizens have protested in the streets of 
Brazil’s major cities, condemning the government’s poor economic per-
formance and pervasive corruption. Many participants in these protests 
called for Rousseff’s impeachment1 (see Watts 2015). A small but notice-
able contingent of protesters even sought the military’s intervention.2 
Although the military did not oust the government, nor does it seem 
inclined to do so, on 12 May 2016, Michel Temer became the interim 
president of Brazil, replacing Rousseff during her impeachment trial in 
the Brazilian Senate on charges of having committed crimes of responsi-
bility. Rousseff’s ouster, in turn, led to counter-protests supporting 
Rousseff and referring to her removal as a non-military coup. While 
Brazilians have flooded major thoroughfares in 2015 and 2016 with little 
fear of government repercussions, this has not always been the case. 
During Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964–1985), public expression of 
anti-government sentiments often triggered repressive government re-
sponses. 
Throughout much of the dictatorship, the military enjoyed the sup-
port – and positive coverage – of the majority of the Brazil’s mainstream 
media (Amaral and Guimarães 1994; Matos 2008), yet the government 
persecuted journalists and editors from alternative publications who 
dared to challenge the regime (Kucinski 2003). In addition to repressing 
journalists and suppressing media freedom, the Brazilian government 
and paramilitary forces routinely responded to dissent with brute force, 
torturing and killing members of the proscribed opposition (Moreira 
Alves 1985; Skidmore 1988; de Freixo and Freitas 2008). Despite the 
“culture of fear” these actions fostered, the anti-government opposition 
developed a mass movement and organized public mass actions, includ-
ing street protests, marches, and strikes, particularly after the govern-
ment began to ease the reins on freedom of expression during the period 
of political liberalization (Moreira Alves 1985). Similar circumstances 
reigned in countries throughout much of Latin America during the 1970s 
and 1980s, and continue today in many countries around the world. 
                                                 
1  On 31 August 2016, the Brazilian Senate voted 61 to 20 to strip Rousseff of the 
presidency for having violated budget laws. 
2  Articles about protests that occurred throughout the year mention protesters 
who wanted the armed forces to intervene. For example, see Watts (2015), 
along with Johnson and Magalhães (2015). 
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Although some authoritarian regimes go to great efforts to control 
media content, others tolerate or even encourage partly free media (Ego-
rov, Guriev, and Sonin 2009; Whitten-Woodring 2009; Whitten-Wood-
ring and James 2012; VonDoepp and Young 2013). Authoritarian gov-
ernments with relatively high state capacity, such as China, can manage 
censorship strategically, allowing the regime to identify foci of dissent 
and try to repress or appease these groups (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013; 
Lorentzen 2014). Press freedom varies, not only across authoritarian 
regimes, but also within regimes over time. Since the media influence 
public opinion, even amid censorship (Stein 2013), public support for 
authoritarian rule, along with the regime’s legitimacy, may wax and wane 
with the changing nature of media content. 
In the Brazilian case, the military government imposed a strict sys-
tem of censorship from 1969 through to the mid-1970s. The govern-
ment allowed media outlets that offered favorable coverage of the re-
gime – which comprised the majority – to carry out censorship them-
selves. By contrast, the government subjected the opposition media, 
including both alternative papers and a few mainstream media outlets 
that began to challenge the regime, to prior censorship. Those publica-
tions subjected to prior censorship had government censors carrying out 
and enforcing restrictions on content. According to Carlos Azevedo, a 
journalist and an activist for Ação Popular (Popular Action),3 by the end 
of the 1970s “[t]he dictatorship started to lose the political battle against 
the newspapers. […] For a long time the press did not oppose the dicta-
torship.”4 The loosening of press restrictions occurred in part because 
Brazil’s president at the time, Ernesto Geisel, had initiated a “slow, grad-
ual and secure” process of political liberalization (Alston et al. 2016: 65),5 
and partly because internal divisions arose among hardliners and softlin-
ers – Geisel was a member of the latter group – that made enforcement 
of such restrictions sporadic and less systematic.  
The media’s potential influence on advancing political liberalization 
extends beyond the information they provide; the media can help open 
space for other forms of expression by pushing the boundaries them-
                                                 
3  Ação Popular was a Catholic leftist movement that participated in the armed 
resistance to the military regime. 
4  Stated in interview with the author on February 2, 2005, São Paulo. Father 
Agostinho Pretto made a very similar comment in his interview with the author 
in Nova Iguaçu, Rio de Janeiro (exact date unknown): “So I could figure out 
the right way to act and how to react.” 
5  Geisel first described the political opening in these terms in a speech in August 
1974 (Kucinski 1982, cited in Stepan 1988: 29). 
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selves. Political scientist Maria Helena Moreira Alves explained in her 
book, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, that as the Brazilian military 
regime loosened the noose on the media “(w)ith the breaking of silence, 
civil society responded, and people tended to take recourse to the new 
public forum to voice protests against government brutality” (1985: 171).  
Opposition leaders can reduce inefficient use of human and materi-
al resources by organizing anti-government mass actions when the risk 
of repression is relatively low and thus likely to draw more participants. 
In order to do so, however, opposition leaders must have access to good 
information on the nature of the regime. Dissident leaders, despite 
knowing that dictatorships censor mainstream media and that journalists 
and editors practice self-censorship, seek out and read the full range of 
news coverage, including pro-government newspapers, rather than disre-
garding censored material. Mino Carta, an editor and journalist for several 
mainstream publications who earned the trust of many members of the 
military regime as well as participants in the opposition, described the main-
stream media in Brazil as opposition leaders’ “bread and butter.” He ex-
plained that reading the mainstream media “was very important for [politi-
cal activists]. Even when censored, the press works as a thermometer.” 
I interviewed6 political activists and journalists who had been active 
during the dictatorship and asked if, knowing they were subjected to 
stringent censorship, militants7 read newspapers for their actual content 
or to try and draw their own conclusions about the situation. Many re-
sponded that people active in the opposition read the newspapers criti-
                                                 
6  Acknowledgments: I carried out this research with funding from the Interna-
tional Institute of Education and the Fulbright Commission of Brazil. I also 
had support from the Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Pol-
icy at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, where I wrote an 
earlier version of this paper when I was a pre-doctoral scholar-in-residence in 
2007. I am indebted to the journalists and activists who shared their stories 
with me. A list of their names appears in Table A1 of the appendix. I also 
greatly appreciate the terrific research assistance of Daniel Develly and Fábio 
Cardoso Andrade in Brazil and Germán Sturzenegger in Cambridge, Massachu-
setts, whose help allowed me to complete this research. Additionally, I thank 
the faculty and fellows at the Shorenstein Center, Barbara Geddes, Matthew 
Baum, Daniel Hallin, Richard Frank and Matthew Jacobsmeier, as well as 
anonymous reviewers for excellent advice. If I failed to follow their sugges-
tions, I accept the blame for mistakes that persist. 
7  In Portuguese, people use the term “militante” (militant) more than they use 
“ativista” (activist) to describe those who fought against military rule, regardless 
of whether they picked up arms or merely took to the streets in protest. I use 
the terms interchangeably through this paper and will specify when I intend to 
refer to the armed guerrilla organizations. 
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cally and with skepticism. Several interviewees remarked that over time 
journalists learned to say certain things without being explicit, just as 
readers learned to “read between the lines” and take note of what did 
not appear in the papers.8 Carlos Azevedo responded:  
Our own goal was to make our own conclusions […] We looked 
for information. We evaluated how good it was by comparing dif-
ferent papers. We wanted to understand what was going on, 
which forces were stronger so we would know how to act on pub-
lic opinion. (Stated in interview with author on 2 February 2005, 
São Paulo, Brazil) 
I argue – with support from many of those whom I interviewed – that 
the media inform leaders of opposition movements in non-democratic 
environments, both directly via their content and indirectly via their 
interactions with government and the opposition. Amid conditions of 
censorship, the tug of war that occurs between journalists – some of 
whom challenge government media restrictions – and state actors reveals 
information about the regime to attentive observers. These interactions 
inform dissident leaders about the nature or disposition of the regime at 
given points in time. Information gleaned from observing media-state 
interactions helps supplement and substantiate information that opposi-
tion activists acquire through their own dealings with the state, individual 
journalists, and with other opposition movements. Opposition leaders 
rely on these observations to help gauge government tolerance for public 
dissent when planning and promoting mass protests. 
To further understand the connection between media liberalization 
and anti-government mass actions in dictatorships, I examine whether 
and how the evolution of anti-government expression corresponded to 
the dynamics between the media and the state and between the media 
and opposition leaders. In this study I have focused primarily on the 
mobilization of unarmed opposition groups to Brazil’s military regime 
during the period of political liberalization. Brazil represents an ideal case 
in which to explore these dynamics because, along with the military re-
gime promoting systematic censorship, it also initiated a prolonged pro-
cess of political opening that lasted 10 years. While Brazil has long since 
                                                 
8  Carlos Azevedo, Carlúcio Castanha, A. C. Fon, Carlos Alberto Lobão, Dulce 
Maia, Frederico Mazzuccheli, Renaldo Morano Filho, and Raimundo Pereira 
each described reading newspapers critically, referenced reading between the 
lines or making conclusions from what did not appear. See the list of interviews 
in Table A1 of the appendix for a list of names of interviewees, along with 
dates and locations of these interviews. 
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democratized, I anticipate that lessons garnered from Brazil’s past au-
thoritarian experience highlight the potential importance of media for 
popular movements around the world who continue to struggle against 
authoritarian rule. 
In the following section, I review the relevant literature. I then ar-
ticulate my theory, drawing from past literature and interviews I con-
ducted with activists and journalists, offering a series of testable hypoth-
eses. After a brief historical overview, I empirically test the implications 
of my argument. I conclude by reviewing the study’s key findings and 
discussing their implications for other citizens hoping to mobilize against 
less-than-democratic regimes. 
2 Understanding and Explaining Patterns of 
Collective Action  
The fact that people participate in risky activities despite the purported 
irrationality of such behavior has been framed as the paradox of collec-
tive action (Olson 1965). Even if an individual wants and supports polit-
ical change, that person should not, rationally, participate in risky actions; 
his or her individual contribution is unlikely to affect the movement’s 
success, but by participating he or she risks arrest, injury, or worse. Nev-
ertheless, it is widely recognized that if all people behaved in this man-
ner, change would never occur, even with majority support (Finkel, Mul-
ler, and Opp 1989). This paradox – that people do in fact join protests 
despite its presumed irrationality – has spawned several lines of research 
to explain why and when people participate in risky mass actions. Seek-
ing explanations, authors have considered motivating factors, resources, 
participants’ relative costs to benefits, and opportunities. 
Some scholars disagree with Olson’s underlying assumption about 
individual rationality, arguing that as social beings, people make collec-
tively rational decisions to protest (Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989; Brock-
ett 1993; Rasler 1996). They note that individuals’ decisions to participate 
depend on the behavior of others (Kuran 1991; Siegel 2009). Charles 
Brockett argued that “(r)eal individuals are usually enmeshed in social 
networks, which might lead them to different perceptions, calculations, 
and behavior” (1993: 462).  
Accepting that people participate in collective actions, but recogniz-
ing that most individuals prefer to maximize the benefits while reducing 
the costs of their participation, some social movement scholars have 
focused on how primarily exogenous factors can generate conditions 
favorable to protesters – political opportunities – that consequently 
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promote participation (Kitschelt 1986; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Meyer 
and Minkoff 2004; Brockett 2005). Some opportunities arise from struc-
tural changes in the underlying conditions, while other opportunities 
emerge from actions following perceived changes in the situation (Gold-
stone and Tilly 2001; Meyer and Minkoff 2004).  
2.1 Relationship between Repression and Protest 
The regime’s potential to use repression weighs in opposition leaders’ 
assessment of political opportunities. However, repression does not 
always deter political action. Regime violence smothers popular mobili-
zation under some circumstances, but provokes it under others (Lich-
bach 1987; Mason and Krane 1989; Opp 1994). Whom the government 
targets with repression (Mason and Krane 1989) and the intensity of 
such repression may affect people’s decision to participate (DeNardo 
1985; Lichbach 1987). Other researchers have noted that governments’ 
variable use of repression and concessions creates countervailing motiva-
tions for participation. Repression discourages participation by generat-
ing fear, but simultaneously encourages mobilization by motivating peo-
ple to join the opposition (Mason and Krane 1989; Rasler 1996). Con-
versely, the regime’s employment of concessions can simultaneously 
appease active protesters and demonstrate to others the usefulness of 
such tactics (Lichbach 1987; Rasler 1996; Ginkel and Smith 1999). 
While many arguments imply that opposition leaders calculate polit-
ical opportunities, current scholarship does not adequately explain how 
leaders gauge opportunity, where they derive their information, and why 
and when early participants willingly take to the street.  
2.2 Information Needs and Risk Assessment 
In order for opposition activists to properly assess risk, which varies 
depending on the government’s willingness and capacity to suppress 
rights or engage in repression, activists must have good information. 
However, authoritarian regimes frequently restrict citizens’ access to 
information through both explicit and implicit media restrictions (Curry 
and Dassin 1982).  
John Ginkel and Alastair Smith suggested that opposition leaders 
receive “noisy” information about the government’s disposition from its 
actions (1999). Incumbent governments know “that opponents can use 
information to coordinate action” and, therefore, “will try to control the 
open circulation of information” (VonDoepp and Young 2013: 37). 
Nevertheless, dictators occasionally permit moderately free media (Ego-
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rov, Guriev, and Sonin 2009; Whitten-Woodring 2009; Whitten-Wood-
ring and James 2012; King, Pan, and Roberts 2013, Lorentzen 2013, 
2014) and sometimes tolerate public protest because media coverage and 
political mobilization provide information to political leaders about the 
depth and breadth of public dissatisfaction (Lohmann 1993; Lorentzen 
2013).  
News coverage also helps opposition leaders communicate with the 
masses and can facilitate the coordination of protest (Gamson and 
Wolfsfeld 1993). Furthermore, mainstream media coverage of protests 
helps generate “common knowledge” (Chwe 2001) about the protest’s 
occurrence and the (lack of a) government response. The public nature 
of information disseminated via mass media informs the audience that 
others also know of the protests; individuals predisposed to support the 
opposition become more likely to participate because they know they 
would be unlikely to do so alone (Lichbach 1994).  
2.3 The Interaction of Violations of Civil Liberties and 
Physical Integrity 
In studying the effectiveness of coercion on autocrats’ survival, Abel 
Escribà-Folch distinguished between the use of violent repression (such 
as violations of personal integrity) and non-violent repression (for exam-
ple, restrictions on civil liberties) to constrain opposition efforts. 
Restrictions [of civil liberties] attempt to deter collective action by 
limiting the coordination and mobilization capacity […] by explic-
itly prohibiting a given set of behaviors and activities and con-
straining others. Alternatively, violations of personal integrity [e.g. 
physical repression] aim at eliminating those individuals or groups 
who the regime suspects of having surpassed those limits or being 
likely to do so, by killing or imprisoning them. (Escribà-Folch 
2013: 547) 
Other studies also have treated the restriction of rights and the violation 
of physical integrity as independent tools of dictators (Davenport 2004; 
Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014), yet dictators’ use of restrictions on 
civil liberties should only serve their intended purpose if accompanied by 
the credible threat of physical repression. In the following section I ar-
ticulate this paper’s theory and expound on governments’ dynamic use 
of both physical repression (henceforth, merely repression) and re-
strictions on liberties. I suggest that these dynamics provide an important 
source of information for opposition leaders constructing mass opposi-
tion movements.  
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3 Theoretical Discussion 
In order to force policy changes or hasten a regime’s collapse, mass ac-
tions must demonstrate visually to the regime the level of support for the 
opposition or, conversely, the strength of the threat against the regime. 
Therefore, opposition leaders aim to maximize attendance at these 
events because higher attendance signifies greater strength and increases 
the chance of attracting media coverage. 
To grow their movements, leaders must regard with the utmost im-
portance the security of potential participants, who are unlikely to take to 
the street or barricade themselves in a classroom if they perceive these 
actions as futile or excessively dangerous. Luiz Momesso, a former union 
activist and journalist during the Brazilian dictatorship explained, “for 
actions like a demonstration at the Praça da Sé, we had to make sure that 
there would be so many people that the police wouldn’t be able to do 
much.”9  
Opposition leaders face two types of uncertainty that act as imped-
iments to collective action: uncertainty about (1) the government’s cohe-
sion and strength, and (2) the masses’ inclination to participate. To re-
duce the first type of uncertainty, in addition to their own interactions 
with government, opposition leaders seek information by observing the 
government in other arenas (Ginkel and Smith 1999). I suggest that one 
key way in which opposition leaders gain insight on government cohe-
sion and strength is by following media coverage and observing media–
state interactions. Jonicael Cedraz de Oliveira, a student activist in Bahia 
during the dictatorship, supports the supposition that observing the 
state’s treatment of journalists offers militants useful information, stat-
ing: “What a journalist couldn’t do, neither could we.”10 Subsequently, 
once leaders initiate mass actions they gain more information and can 
adapt their group’s strategy based on turnout and how the government 
responds to mass actions once initiated. 
My argument builds on previous theories of political opportunity 
and mobilization. I specifically focus on the role the media play in (a) 
generating opportunity and (b) helping leaders to recognize opportuni-
ties. Several activists interviewed for this project indicated that opportu-
nities strongly determined the type and timing of anti-government ac-
                                                 
9  The Praça da Sé is a principal public space in the center of São Paulo. Stated in 
an interview with the author on 3 March 2005, Recife, Brazil.  
10  Stated in an interview with the author on 28 February 2005, Salvador, Bahía. 
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tions.11 If opposition leaders seek opportunities to plan mass actions 
when the regime is weak or more tolerant of dissent, this implies that 
they can identify opportunities when the risk associated with participa-
tion is low and publicize them. When asked how his student organization 
decided when to plan mass actions, former student activist Gustavo 
Zimmermann explained that “(i)t was always possibility meeting oppor-
tunity. Our goal was to involve the most people in the activities […].”12 
Reinaldo Morano Filho, an activist and member of one of the 
armed organizations, clarified that the armed movements operated under 
a different set of rules than larger popular organizations. Whereas popu-
lar movements “observed the political moment” timing their actions 
with political occurrences such as a vote in Congress or the arrest of 
professors, actions of the armed movements, “[l]ike raising funds by 
robbing banks […] had nothing to do with opportunities; they were a 
matter of planning and logistics.”13  
According to Ginkel and Smith (1999: 299), opposition leaders “act 
as information providers” and persuade the masses of the value of en-
gaging in mass actions. To maintain the trust of the masses – and sustain 
mass opposition movements – opposition leaders must provide the par-
ticipants with good information, which is a scarce resource in dictator-
ships.  
The quality of media content in dictatorships depends on a combi-
nation of the government’s permissiveness and the tenacity of journalists 
and their editors. Even at pro-government newspapers, some editors and 
journalists try to report as honestly as possible. Afonso de Albuquerque 
(2012) noted that conservative newspaper owners in Brazil – wanting to 
modernize their papers – granted journalists on their staff considerable 
autonomy during the military regime. Audálio Dantas, a journalist and 
former president of the São Paulo journalists’ union explained that while 
censorship made journalists cautious, they still “were able to write some 
important pieces [… they] were careful, but [they] kept trying.”14 
Under conditions of limited press freedom, more information is 
available than one might initially presume. Editors and publishers want 
                                                 
11  Several interview subjects mentioned that their organizations planned political 
actions based on opportunities, including Carlúcio Castanha and Renaldo Mo-
rano Filho in interviews with the author, conducted on 3 March 2005, Recife, 
Pernambuco and 2 February 2005, São Paulo, respectively.  
12  Stated in an interview with the author on 7 December 2004, Campinas, São 
Paulo. 
13  Stated in an interview with the author on 2 February 2005, São Paulo. 
14  Stated in an interview with the author on 2 February 2005, São Paulo. 
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to placate the government – or at least remain free from prosecution – 
but also want to sell more newspapers to citizens eager for substantive 
news. Thus, a natural tension arises between the government’s desire for 
control and journalists’ desire to act as the public’s watchdog. This forces 
the regime to make a choice: it can prohibit the critical information via 
prior censorship, respond harshly ex post, or let the incident pass.  
The manner in which the government reacts to a defiant press re-
veals to observers the likely risk of challenging the regime. When news-
papers publish an increasing number of reports or editorials that address 
taboo topics and the regime does not suppress the content or respond 
with repressive actions against the journalists and editors, opposition 
leaders infer that the regime is either (a) more tolerant of anti-regime 
expression or (b) in a weakened position and unable to impose its de-
sired constraints on the press. In either case, the risk to participants di-
minishes, creating an optimal time for opposition leaders to plan anti-
government mass actions.  
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the number of anti-government mass actions 
increases following increases in the number of stories on taboo 
subjects. 
 
The government’s response to mass actions – offering concessions and/ 
or employing repression – may influence other groups’ subsequent deci-
sions to take or avoid further action.  
However, if journalists who challenge the regime face repression, 
such as arrests or beatings, or journalists’ material is censored or seized, I 
suggest that opposition leaders will surmise that the regime is intolerant 
of anti-regime expression and has the political will to repress it. In these 
circumstances, opposition leaders should heed the cue and hold off on 
initiating new actions.  
 
H2: When increases in taboo content are accompanied by repres-
sive or suppressive actions against the media, the subsequent initi-
ation of mass actions declines. 
 
For example, when asked if the imprisonment of a journalist for some-
thing he wrote might influence activists’ plans for subsequent political 
actions, one activist replied emphatically, “Yes, of course.”15  
                                                 
15  Dulce Maia, who was a member of the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard 
(VPR), one of the armed opposition movements, said this in an interview with 
the author on 20 January 2005, Cunha, São Paulo. Note, however, that Maia 
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Weary of attracting few participants, opposition leaders instead 
might draw from their repertoire of less risky actions, such as circulating 
petitions or issuing manifestos. When a government ceases to repress the 
media and allows them to publish freely, the media no longer serve as a 
reliable barometer of the government’s disposition. As censorship de-
clines, the relationship between mass actions and media coverage should 
begin to dissipate. 
The above hypotheses suggest that dissident leaders rely on the me-
dia as a barometer of the government’s disposition toward dissent in 
planning mass actions. Nevertheless, other underlying factors beyond 
media coverage will inspire participation in anti-government mass ac-
tions. Economic downturns may mobilize anti-government demonstra-
tors; so, too, can economic success if the gains are not distributed well 
among the masses. Particular government actions may also galvanize 
active support for the opposition. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of 
such events in relation to trends in news coverage should demonstrate 
the media’s leading role. 
3.1 Alternative Hypotheses and Their Implications 
Instead, activists may take to the streets first and pave the way for jour-
nalists to increase their critical coverage. From this perspective, journal-
ists publish more openly only after the opposition begins to protest and 
the government has demonstrated its tolerance for anti-regime expres-
sion; this implies that: 
 
AH1: Increases in taboo content should follow increases in mass 
action, all else being equal, and  
 
AH2: (a) Taboo content should increase after mass actions to 
which the government responds with concessions, whereas (b) 
taboo content should decline following government repression of 
mass actions. 
 
Alternatively, journalists and activists may respond independently to a 
third factor or actor, perhaps taking cues directly from the regime’s ac-
tions or statements.  
 
                                                                                                    
participated in armed actions, then lived in exile, and only returned with the 
amnesty granted in mid-1979; it is not entirely clear whether this comment re-
ferred to all types of opposition actions, or armed actions specifically. 
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AH3: Mass actions and critical coverage should trend together. 
 
In the latter case, journalists are likely to react more rapidly than political 
activists, who need time to mobilize participants. If this were the case, 
the patterns of mass action and taboo content might mimic the same 
pattern highlighted by my theory. However, if journalists and activists 
react directly to regime actions, I should capture this through measures 
of government repression and concessions to protesters included in the 
model. I also include controls for both positive and negative government 
actions (that is, signals), such as acts of political liberalization (for exam-
ple, the release of activists, return of exiles or regaining of suspended 
political rights) and repressive tactics against opposition not exclusive to 
mass actions (such as arrests, torture, kidnapping, killing, etc.). In the 
next section I describe the context shaping political behavior of the me-
dia and opposition during military rule in Brazil. 
4 Military Rule in Brazil 
4.1 The Media under Military Rule 
Initially, with rare exceptions, the mainstream newspapers reflected the 
views of the military regime, partly due to the threat or reality of censor-
ship, but also because newspaper owners held the same ideological be-
liefs as government elites (Skidmore 1988; Smith 1997; Alves de Abreu 
2002; Gentilli 2008).  
Nearly five years into military rule, the dictatorship initiated its most 
repressive phase via the implementation of the Fifth Institutional Act 
(AI-5), which the opposition referred to as the “coup within the coup,” 
(de Freixo and Freitas 2008: 10).16 Under the powers created by AI-5, 
the military passed Decree-Law 1.077 in January 1970 that instituted 
prior censorship – when government censors reviewed and rejected 
material before it went to press. Before implementing prior censorship, 
the Brazilian government issued notices, known as bilhetinhos, listing 
prohibited topics (Marconi 1980; Smith 1997; authors’ interviews 2004–
2005); the government euphemistically referred to this system as self-
                                                 
16  Mino Carta used this term in his interview with the author on 31 January 2005, 
São Paulo. Elifas Andreato, a graphic designer for alternative publications, re-
ferred to it as “the greater coup” in his interview with the author on 31 January 
2005, São Paulo. 
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censorship because the government expected editors and news produc-
ers to implement these restrictions themselves.17 
The emergence of alternative publications in the late 1960s and ear-
ly 1970s offered members of the opposition other information outlets. 
The government subjected the legal alternative press to heavy-handed 
censorship, and pursued and persecuted those groups responsible for 
underground publications (Kucinski 2003; Kushnir 2004). The alterna-
tive press lacked the resources and access of the mainstream press, inhib-
iting their ability to regularly report on critical issues and news of the day. 
Despite censorship, the alternative press and even some publications 
among the mainstream media managed to challenge the voice of gov-
ernment. Raimundo Pereira, a founder and chief editor of the alternative 
news magazines Opinião and Movimento, explained:  
We couldn’t denounce tortures, murders, prohibitions. But, for in-
stance, the economy section wasn’t censored that much. So, while 
conservative newspapers avoided subjects such as the rural re-
form, the country’s economic situation and such, we wrote about 
it and managed to do a useful job.18 
At the start of the 1970s, most mainstream press still remained strongly 
tethered to government. Opposition media, by contrast, continued to 
battle the dictatorship, facing onerous forms of censorship. In 1975, 
soon after the regime initiated a political opening, the military withdrew 
its censors from the mainstream publications like Estado de São Paulo and 
select alternative publications. The government completely ended prior 
censorship in June 1978. Nonetheless, the regime and its allies continued 
to threaten journalists and their editors with physical harm, lawsuits, 
confiscations, and other forms of intimidation to discourage journalists 
from overzealous coverage with their newly found freedom (Kucinski 
2003). 
Some observers felt that the mainstream media were acquiescent 
throughout most of the period of dictatorial rule (Smith 1997). Others 
have contested this generalization and suggested that some editors and 
journalists resisted government constraints, even at pro-government 
publications including Folha de São Paulo. In interviews with the author, 
journalists Mauricio Azêdo and Mino Carta and activist Dulce Maia each 
touted Claudio Abramo, who severed as editor-in-chief of Folha de São 
                                                 
17  Mino Carta noted that prior to the bilhetinhos, the editorial staff received menac-
ing phone calls explaining these prohibitions (stated in an interview with the 
author on 31 January 2005, São Paulo).  
18  Interview with the author on 14 December 2004, São Paulo, Brazil. 
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Paulo from 1973 through mid-September, 1977, as an example of some-
one willing to push the implicit boundaries (see Table A1 in the appen-
dix for interview dates). Abramo reformed the paper, professionalizing 
both its appearance and content, such as adding editorial pages. In Sep-
tember 1977, Abramo pushed the limits too far, publishing a blank space 
in place of the newspaper column of a Folha columnist who recently had 
been arrested. Under pressure from the government, Octávio Frias de 
Oliveira, the paper’s owner, forced Abramo to step down as editor-in-
chief.19  
4.2 Opposition under Military Rule 
While public contestation existed in restricted form from the regime’s 
inception since it maintained semi-competitive legislative elections, in the 
early-to-mid 1970s, opposition actions shifted from insurgency, which 
the regime had successfully repressed, to civil disobedience. The less 
institutionalized opposition, comprised of students, intellectuals, Catho-
lic bishops, labor unions, and neighborhood and professional associa-
tions (Moreira Alves 1985; Skidmore 1988), burgeoned as censorship 
waned. Massive student protests in 1977 marked the first wave of mass 
actions subsequent to the implementation of the AI-5; soon after, met-
alworkers initiated strikes, and other mass movements followed suit. 
Mass actions became more common in the latter half of military rule. 
Although the regime attempted to repress or at least limit these actions, 
they were constrained by their official position of supporting a détente 
and eventual political opening. 
4.3 Opposition and Acquisition of Information under 
Military Rule 
According to many activists and journalists who I interviewed, leaders of 
opposition movements gained information through a variety of means, 
including government leaks, personal contact with journalists, and from 
reading the mainstream news as “a habit.”20 Many activists relied on 
personal relationships with journalists, usually those who worked for the 
alternative press. These opposition journalists, often activists themselves, 
received inside information from their contacts in the mainstream press 
                                                 
19  Carta discussed Abramo’s departure from Folha de São Paulo in his interview 
with the author on 31 January 2005. 
20  Renaldo Morano Filho stated this in an interview with the author on 1 Febru-
ary 2005 in São Paulo. 
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that they passed along to members of opposition movements. Dulce 
Maia described journalists as conduits who would receive information 
from activists and deliver information to activists (stated in her interview 
with the author on 20 January 2005 in Cunha in the state of São Paulo). 
Opposition leaders could become aware of actions taken against the 
media by noticing a publication’s absence at the newsstands, learning of 
it through personal contact, or reading about it in the news. As the pro-
cess of political liberalization progressed, mainstream news outlets that 
had been long aligned with the regime were able to publish more critical 
information,21 even including information on instances of censorship or 
confiscation. Editorial writer Alberto Dines, who served as the media 
critic, had a Sunday column in Folha de São Paulo, titled “Jornal dos Jor-
nais” (the Newspaper of Newspapers), in which he reported on such 
incidents (Magalhães 2001).22  
5 Methodology 
5.1 Model Specification 
Opposition leaders in Brazil relied heavily on a broad selection of print 
media. Though radio and television played an important role in enter-
taining and informing the masses, newspapers were disproportionately 
influential relative to their circulation (Smith 1997); radio and television 
required government licenses and broadcast journalists were far less 
likely to challenge the regime (Waisbord 2000). To test whether the 
mainstream media served as a barometer influencing the timing of politi-
cal actions (H1 and H2), I coded content from the Folha de São Paulo 
(Folha), one of the main daily newspapers. I take the content of Folha as a 
sign of the general mainstream media environment. While there was 
some variation in content among mainstream media outlets, the govern-
ment forced those that held ideologically divergent views out of business 
                                                 
21  As evidence of this, censors cut stories submitted by the alternative publication 
Opinião, that had already been printed in Folha de São Paulo. (Fernando Gaspari-
an, owner of Opinião, described this in interview with author on 29 January 
2005 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). 
22  For example, some opposition groups had access to newspapers prior to being 
censored; some media distributed cut material by hand or circulated it in news-
letters. In his interview with the author on 14 December 2004 in São Paulo, 
Brazil, Raimundo Pereira, who edited Movimento, explained that the editorial 
team distributed a report on censored material to their 500 investors around the 
country, which the investors could then redistribute to newsstands and other 
interested parties. 
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early in the regime or placed them under heavy-handed prior censorship. 
Raimundo Pereira, the journalist and editor of two of the most promi-
nent publications in the alternative press, noted that  
in the beginning, the strong repressive acts destroyed the biggest 
paper in the country, Última Hora, and all the publications of the 
left from the Communist Party, the Catholic Left, from UNE 
[Student organization …] but this happened with the coup.23  
Other publications operated under the less oppressive form of “self-
censorship,” with the implicit threat of prior censorship if they violated 
these directives.  
In this work I have focused specifically on how the leaders of the 
opposition movements gathered information on risk. Based on my inter-
views, leaders of the opposition movements read several sources from 
the mainstream press. As then-student-activist Frederico Mazzucchelli 
explained, he “read the [mainstream press] to try and figure them out 
even though (he) knew they’d been through censorship.”24 A. C. Fon, a 
journalist and political militant, stated that they  
couldn’t just read what activists wrote. There was a lot to grasp 
from conservative journalists as well. When information is your 
instrument, you must read it all.  
Many of those whom I interviewed specifically mentioned reading Folha 
de São Paulo.25 I chose to code Folha de São Paulo rather than the other 
mainstream newspapers because, while it remained closely tied with the 
ideology of the government – never falling subject to prior censorship 
like its main rival O Estado de São Paulo – it maintained a reputation for 
contesting the regime, at least on the margins, compared to O Globo, the 
Rio de Janeiro-based newspaper that befitted greatly from its ties to the 
military regime.  
The Folha Group represented a profound contradiction. On one 
hand, the Frias de Oliveira family, owners of the media group, aligned 
ideologically with the military regime and offered the repressive agencies 
material support.26 On the other hand, the Folha Group newspapers were 
                                                 
23 Interview with the author on 14 December 2004, São Paulo, Brazil. 
24  Mentioned in interview with the author on 7 December 2004. 
25 A few of those who specifically mentioned Folha were Maurício Azêdo, Carlos 
Azevedo, Carlos Alberto Lobão, Dulce Maia, Luiz Momesso (see Table A1 in 
the appendix for interview dates). 
26  See Beatriz Kushnir’s book (2004) for a more elaborate description of the Folha 
Group’s relationship with the military regime. Kushnir notes that at some point 
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known for employing many well-educated leftist journalists.27 Therefore, 
journalists at Folha de São Paulo (Folha) had personal incentives to push 
the limits of government tolerance and were given some leeway by their 
owners (de Albuquerque 2012). While Folha developed a reputation for 
challenging the government, they earned this in large part due to their 
coverage of the Diretas Já campaign in the final years of the military 
dictatorships, after the period I have examined in this research. For a 
brief period at the beginning of the political opening, under the direction 
of Editor-in-Chief Claudio Abramo, Folha began to reform itself and 
take a more independent, professionalized approach to its news cover-
age. Nevertheless, based on the coding of the Folha for “taboo content,” 
described in more detail later in this section, the newspaper only began 
increasing its coverage of such “off-limits” topics in 1977 at the end of 
Abramo’s time as editor-in-chief (see Figure 1 in Section 5.2). Coverage 
of taboo content increased under the subsequent editor-in-chief, Boris 
Casoy, who described his replacement of Abramo as one of survival for 
the paper because it needed to censor itself (Kushnir 2011: 177–178). I 
interpret this as an indication that shifts in topic do reflect shifts in the 
regime’s disposition more so than a shift in the position of the editor or 
owner exclusively.  
Furthermore, based on these interviews, I assume that the leaders of 
opposition movements observed more than one mainstream newspaper 
and were likely to have been exposed directly or indirectly to content 
from Folha.28 Additionally, one activist noted that once one paper report-
ed on an issue, the others would follow or risk losing readers.29 Papers 
                                                                                                    
Folha da Tarde’s editorial staff included politically active leftists as well as mem-
bers of the military apparatus (Kushnir 2007: 28).  
27  Luiz Momesso stated this in an interview with the author on 3 March 2005, 
Recife, Pernambuco. Ricardo Azevedo , a student activist and member of Ação 
Popular (Popular Action), also noted that, for a time, many progressive journal-
ists worked at Folha da Tarde, the Folha Group’s afternoon edition (stated in an 
interview with the author on 7 December 2004 in São Paulo). However, the 
DOI-CODI, the Brazilian intelligence agency, eventually controlled the news-
room at Folha da Tarde under the direction of Antônio Aggio from July 1969 
until May 1984 (Kushnir 2011). (Also mentioned by Ricardo Azevedo, Dulce 
Maia and others in their interviews with the author. See Table A1 in the appen-
dix for interview dates.)  
28  I favored a paper from São Paulo over Rio de Janeiro, not only because the 
former is the largest city in Brazil and the financial center, but also because it 
was the center of political opposition movements in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.  
29  Jonicael Cedraz, at the time a student activist in Bahía, stated this in an inter-
view with the author on 28 February 2005, Salvador, Bahia. 
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outside the principal cities relied heavily on wire services and therefore 
had similar content, often drawn from the papers in São Paulo and Rio 
de Janeiro. If the media responded to and reflected regime dynamics, 
content changes at Folha should accurately reflect the state of the regime 
at given points in time during the period of political liberalization. 
I coded every 10th day that the newspaper was published from 1974 
through 1982, reading everything except the international, sports, and 
classified sections.30 The sample covered all seven days of the week, 
avoiding bias due to systematic variations in coverage across days, and 
the 10-day interval remained close enough that I did not risk missing 
major events. 
5.1.1 Dependent Variable 
For each issue of the newspaper, ni, that I coded, I registered any men-
tion of mass actions.31 I define mass actions as acts requiring many par-
ticipants’ physical presence, exposing them to the risk of direct and im-
mediate government reprisals. Strikes, marches, sit-ins, and demonstra-
tions qualify as mass actions, whereas publishing an open letter or circu-
lating a petition would not. If provided in the article, I recorded who 
participated, the participants’ demands, when the event began and how 
long it lasted. The dependent variable is the total number of Mass Ac-
tions, initiated over a 10-day period, ti, appearing in the sampled news-
paper content.32  
As a count of the number of mass actions initiated, these data vio-
late the assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression because 
they only consist of non-negative integers heavily weighted toward zero. 
The negative binomial model, like the Poisson model, allows for a count 
                                                 
30  I hired research assistants in Brazil to help with coding newspaper content. We 
initially double-coded every 10th date coded, but less than a month into this 
work, a strike closed the national library for an extended period during my 
fieldwork. Therefore, I had to complete the coding at the Library of Congress 
upon my return. Copies of the original coding sheets are available upon re-
quest. 
31  To allay concerns of under-reporting due to censorship of anti-government 
actions, note that the article did not need to have appeared immediately after 
the protest. 
32  A research assistant coded foreign news sources, including Facts on File, The New 
York Times, The Economist, Newsweek and U.S. News and World Report, for men-
tions of anti-government activity in Brazil. Folha covered events that appeared 
in the foreign press, but provided greater detail and also covered incidents ab-
sent in the international press. Therefore, I have relied solely on data from the 
Folha for the dependent variable.  
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dependent variable; unlike Poisson, however, it also corrects for overdis-
persion due to contagion or time dependence (Barron 1992).33 The in-
clusion of the lagged dependent variable, Mass Actions during ti-3, as 
an explanatory variable was theoretically relevant to capture movement 
dynamics, and it also helps correct for autocorrelation that occurs from a 
lack of independence between time periods (Pickering 2002; Meyer and 
Minkoff 2004).  
5.1.2 Independent Variables 
The key independent variable measures the number of articles, editorials, 
and cartoons that addressed “taboo” subjects appearing in an issue ni of 
the newspaper. I defined Taboo Content as any material that addressed 
one of the following eight categories: (1) criticism of economic policy or 
mismanagement of the economy, (2) crimes and corruption by top gov-
ernment officials, (3) negative information or exposés about the leader or 
his family, (4) splits within the ruling group, (5) citations of the non-
sanctioned opposition, (6) opposition electoral efforts, (7) anti-govern-
ment satire, and (8) criticism of government bodies or non-economic 
policies (Collings 2001).34 Taboo content and all subsequent independent 
variables, unless otherwise noted, were lagged by 30 days, ti-3. While elite 
cues in the press can immediately affect public opinion, it logically takes 
longer for activists to translate information into mass mobilization.35  
To corroborate the assumptions I used for coding – and to gain 
greater insight into the relationship between journalists and activists – I 
conducted interviews with media personnel and a broad range of people 
involved with the opposition to the Brazilian dictatorship. During each 
interview, I suggested that authoritarian regimes prohibit coverage of 
certain topics and listed the categories of taboo content above. When 
asked if the Brazilian dictatorship considered these topics off limits, the 
majority of interviewees agreed with this list, although a few felt that 
journalists could report on economic performance or government policy 
at some points during military rule. 
To control for the government’s treatment of the media, I rely on 
two variables derived from the content analysis. Anti-Media Acts 
measures actions taken against media outlets, including incidents of cen-
                                                 
33  Running the models with auto-regressive Poisson does not change the results. 
34  For a description of coding rules, see the online appendix. 
35  Text messaging and social networking media that exist today likely have re-
duced the time needed to organize mass actions by alleviating some costs of 
coordination. 
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sorship and intimidation, confiscation of printed material, publication 
closures, bombings of press offices and newsstands, and other actions 
such as lawsuits. This variable sums the number of these incidents that 
took place during the 10-day period ti.36 While these events were some-
times reported well after they occurred, I adjusted them to the date they 
occurred because I believe the opposition would have noticed newspa-
pers or magazines missing from all newsstands.  
Journalist Attacks measure actions directed against journalists, edi-
tors, and media owners rather than the publication. The government 
employed these tactics against all citizens determined as threats to the 
regime. The attacks include arrests, physical injuries, disappearances, 
kidnappings, torture, and murder. The variable counts the total number 
of attacks suffered by members of the media that were reported in issue 
ni. While some people may have witnessed these attacks, I concluded that 
it is the reporting of them that sends the message of risk, and therefore, 
unlike anti-media acts, I did not adjust the attacks to the date of their 
occurrence.  
Since I theorized that the media serve as a barometer of the gov-
ernment’s tolerance of anti-regime expression through their content and 
via the government reactions these challenges provoke, it is not the ar-
rest of a journalist per se that signals activists that it is unsafe to protest, 
but rather the perception that government repressed or suppressed the 
media in response to shifts in content. Therefore, I included two interaction 
terms: Taboo Content x Anti-Media Acts that occurred during ti and 
Taboo Content x Journalist Attacks published in issue ni . An increas-
ing amount of critical content, absent anti-media acts, should lead to 
increased protest. If anti-media acts or attacks against journalists also 
increased, the interaction of the two variables should predict a decline in 
subsequent protests. 
Although the fact that the media could report on these issues calls 
into question the regime’s depth of control over the press, it is important 
to remember that this research focuses on the period of political liberali-
zation that then-President Ernesto Geisel formally had declared. The 
regime also benefited to some degree from coverage of their repressive 
actions by relaying to other members of the press what fate they or their 
publication might meet should the push the implicit boundaries to far. 
Ultimately, even if repressive actions against the press indicated a split 
                                                 
36  We did not limit anti-media acts and journalist attacks exclusively to Folha and 
the journalists who worked there. Not only were we trying to capture the over-
all environment, but also, since many journalists did not sign their articles, it 
was not always transparent who was responsible for particular pieces. 
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within the regime between softliners and hardliners, journalists and activ-
ists needed to take heed so long as the hardliners controlled some or all 
of the repressive apparatus.  
I also controlled for the government’s response to protesters or 
strikers and to their demands, including concessions made to participants 
and repression used against them. I documented whether participants 
were injured, arrested, or killed in the course of taking action and wheth-
er the government offered any concessions. If the government fully 
conceded to demands, I scored Concessions one; if they complied with 
some but not all demands or offered partial concessions, I scored it 0.5; 
if the paper reported that the government refused concessions or did not 
report any resolution, I marked it zero. If no demands were reported 
initially, I treated it as though no concessions were made. I scored Re-
pression similarly: if the newspaper reported the government’s use of 
violence, arrests, or extreme measures such as employing tear gas or 
impeding an event from occurring, I assigned it one. If the regime react-
ed with a ‘show’ of force, by sending a police presence, or threatened to 
use force but did not, I scored repression as 0.5. If the newspaper re-
ported that the regime took no action or did not report any repression, I 
scored it zero. The variables in the analyses are the sum of these values 
for all mass actions during the 10-day period ti. 
I included two additional variables to capture possible government 
“signals.” The variable Opposition Attacks captures government re-
pression of the opposition (absent members of the media) and sums the 
number of victims reported in a given issue, ni, who suffered injury, 
arrest, kidnapping, torture, murder, and other offenses. Since many 
scholars have proposed a non-monotonic relationship between repres-
sion and protest, I also included the variable’s squared value. Political 
Liberalization sums the number of people who were released from 
prison, returned from exile, or who regained their suspended political 
rights reported in issue ni of the newspaper. 
I included two dummy variables that note whether the observation 
fell while the Fifth Institutional Act (AI-5) remained in place or after 
Brazil returned to a multiparty system during the period of Post-Party 
Reform, neither of which I lagged. The extra-constitutional powers of 
AI-5 should have deterred protests because the government could arrest 
people without cause and justify other abusive measures. As Brazil 
moved from a two-party to a multi-party system, a broader segment of 
the population could channel their opposition through political parties 
rather than via tactics employed by civil society. As a result, participation 
in mass actions should decline. 
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In line with literature on grievances, I controlled for economic con-
ditions that might motivate or deter protests, including Monthly Infla-
tion, the lagged rate for the municipality of São Paulo37, and the Annual 
Growth in GDP/capita for all of Brazil, which I do not lag (World 
Development Indicators 2000). 
5.2 Trends in Coverage vs. Trends in Activism 
Despite President Geisel’s 1974 proclamation of political opening, at the 
onset of political liberalization the media’s coverage was benign from the 
government’s perspective. Figure 1 illustrates annual taboo content, 
broken down by topic, from 1974 through 1982. As political liberaliza-
tion progressed, the media published more freely with fewer threats of 
government reprisal. When the government completely abandoned prior 
censorship in June 1978, the media were already reporting somewhat 
critically of the regime. While taboo content generally continued an up-
ward trend beginning in 1977, coverage of taboo subjects reversed 
course in 1982.38 The decline of taboo content in 1982 may reflect the 
fact that political dialogue shifted its focus to the newly direct gubernato-
rial elections. Since I did not code coverage after 1982, I cannot tell if the 
decline was temporary.  
The data show that the government repressed the media and sup-
pressed media content more frequently during the first years of political 
liberalization when mass actions remained rare. The initiation of mass 
student protests began in 1976 and became more frequent in 1977, prior 
to the termination of prior censorship. After this time, the government 
and paramilitary groups continued to harass and intimidate the press, 
although the press had greater autonomy.  
 
                                                 
37  DIEESE, online: <www.dieese.org.br/cgi-bin/wwwi32.exe/[in=bmacessa.in]> 
(10 August 2016). 
38  Party reform in 1979 posed a dilemma for coding citations from the opposi-
tion. Prior to the reform, the military regime sanctioned an opposition party, 
the MDB. I did not code citations by members of the MDB because the party 
played by the military’s institutional rules. As part of the 1979 mandated re-
form, the MDB reformed itself as the PMDB, losing some members to newly 
formed parties. After party reform I include citations by members of all the 
opposition parties, including the PMDB, because these parties now challenged 
the rules introduced by the military regime. I ran results excluding quotes from 
the PMDB in taboo content; no changes occurred in the direction of coeffi-
cients and the coefficients maintained their statistical and substantive signifi-
cance. 
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Figure 1. Taboo Content in Folha de São Paulo by Topic, 1974–1982 
 
Note:  This is not the total number of stories that appeared on these topics from 1974 
to 1982, but rather the total number of stories on these topics that appeared in 
the sample of issues coded. For comparison, I weighted the data so that each 
year had 36 days. 
To determine with greater certainty the relationship between activism 
and media coverage, as well as the mediating effects of anti-media acts 
and journalist attacks, I conducted statistical analyses controlling for 
some factors that were likely to influence both media coverage and polit-
ical activism. 
6 Data Analysis and Discussion of Results 
The results of the statistical analyses are consistent with the hypothesis 
that the media served as a “barometer” for political activists planning 
mass actions throughout the period of political liberalization (1974–
1982) in Brazil (see columns 1 to 4 in Table 1). These models indicate 
that when the newspaper printed more taboo content in an issue, i, the 
number of protests tended to increase during the period ti-3. This sup-
ports hypothesis H1 that portends increases in the number of mass ac-
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tions following increasing taboo coverage, and allows me to reject the 
null hypothesis that no relationship existed between protests and media 
content. 
Table 1. How Media Coverage and Government Treatment of Media  
Influence Subsequent Mass Actions 
Negative binomial 
regression with lagged 
d.v. 
1974–1982 
DV = Mass Actions at ti 1 2 3 4 
Mass Actions ti-3 0.142 * 0.146 * 0.111 * 0.103 * 
  (0.062) (0.062) (0.053) (0.049) 
Taboo Content ni-3 0.129 ** 0.091 * 0.085 * 0.116 ** 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) 
Anti-Media Acts ti-3 0.419 † 0.436 † 0.460 * 0.555 * 
  (0.220) (0.232) (0.228) (0.232) 
Journalist Attacks ni-3 0.079 0.053 0.108 0.166 * 
  (0.074) (0.077) (0.077) (0.079) 
Taboo Content ni-3 x  
Anti-Media Acts ti-3 -0.108 ** -0.100 * -0.090 * -0.118 * 
  (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.046) 
Taboo Content ni-3 x 
Journalist Attacks ni-3  -0.029 † -0.020  -0.036 * -0.051 ** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Concessions ti-3  0.084 0.086 0.112 † 0.164 ** 
(protest-specific) (0.061) (0.063) (0.059) (0.060) 
Repression ti-3 0.193 0.174 0.094 0.094 
(protest-specific) (0.135) (0.135) (0.117) (0.138) 
Monthly Inflation Rate ti-3 – 0.098 * 0.040 – 
(São Paulo  
municipality)   (0.047)  (0.061)    
GDP/capita growth, 
annual –  -0.028  -0.040 * –  
  (0.018) (0.018) 
Fifth-Institutional Act  
(AI-5)  –  –  -1.097 *** -1.267 *** 
  (0.256) (0.280) 
Post-Party Reform  – – -0.768 ** -0.629 * 
(multiparty system) (0.237) (0.249) 
Political Liberalization ti-3 – – – 0.061 
  (0.053) 
Opposition Repression ti-3 – – – 0.012 ** 
(excluding journalists) (0.004) 
Opposition Repression ti-32 – – – 0.00004 
(excluding journalists) (0.00004) 
Observations 322  319  316  313  
Wald Chi2 59.43  81.96  76.3  78.47  
Log Pseudolikelihood -540.48 *** -526.29 *** -526.41 *** -519.27 *** 
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Negative binomial re-
gression with lagged d.v. 
Pre-Party Reform Post-Party Reform 
DV = Mass Actions at ti 5 6 7 8 
Mass Actions ti-3 0.203 † 0.204 0.049 0.034 
  (0.112) (0.128) (0.051) (0.049) 
Taboo Content ni-3 0.285 *** 0.335 *** 0.014 0.011 
  (0.078) (0.089) (0.030) (0.029) 
Anti-Media Acts ti-3 0.503 * 0.649 ** 0.255 0.355 
  (0.235) (0.242) (0.248) (0.269) 
Journalist Attacks ni-3 0.204 * 0.221 † -0.039 -0.004 
  (0.102) (0.119) (0.101) (0.111) 
Taboo Content ni-3 x  
Anti-Media Acts ti-3 -0.271 *** -0.305 *** -0.045  -0.083 † 
  (0.076) (0.082) (0.037) (0.044) 
Taboo Content ni-3 x Jour-
nalist Attacks ni-3  -0.075 * -0.086 ** -0.029  -0.034  
  (0.029) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) 
Concessions ti-3  0.214 * 0.248 * -0.740 * -0.673 * 
(protest-specific) (0.093) (0.112) (0.300) (0.300) 
Repression ti-3 0.183 0.165 0.300 0.259 
(protest-specific) (0.198) (0.244) (0.210) (0.247) 
Monthly Inflation Rate ti-3 – – – – 
(São Paulo  
municipality)         
GDP/capita growth, 
annual –  –  –  –  
  
Fifth-Institutional Act  
(AI-5)  –  –  –  –  
  
Post-Party Reform  – – – – 
(multiparty system) 
Political Liberalization ti-3 – 0.066 – 0.043 † 
  (0.056) (0.023) 
Opposition Repression ti-3 – 0.018 *** – 0.005 † 
(excluding journalists) (0.005) (0.003) 
Opposition Repression ti-32 – 0.00005 – 0.0001 † 
(excluding journalists) (0.0001) (0.00003)
Observations 206  200  116  116  
Wald Chi2 111.55  143.45  9.15  36.43  
Log Pseudolikelihood -298.51 *** -281.42 *** -217.11 -214.45 *** 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p  0.001; ** p  0.010; * p  0.050; 
† p  0.100. Constants were included, but are not reported here. In all models 
likelihood ratio tests of alpha=0, run on equivalent models without robust s.e., 
produce statistically significant Chi2 that indicate overdispersed data; negative 
binomial rather than Poisson is appropriate. 
The effect of taboo content on mass actions depended on the incidence 
of censorship, confiscation of published material, closure of media out-
lets, along with other anti-media acts. The negative coefficients for the 
first interaction term, which remain statistically significant across all four 
models, indicate that when actions against the media accompanied in-
creases in taboo content, protesters initiated fewer mass actions during 
  Censoring the Press 127
 

 
the 10-day period one month later. This finding supports H2 that pre-
dicts that opposition leaders should refrain from organizing new protests 
when the government employs suppressive tactics against media outlets 
as critical coverage increases. Providing additional support for this hy-
pothesis, the negative coefficients for the second interaction term be-
tween attacks against media personnel and taboo content show that 
when both increased simultaneously, the number of new protests during 
a 10-day period tended to decline the following month. The coefficient 
for the second interaction term becomes statistically significant at stand-
ard levels only when I include additional controls in the model. Interest-
ingly, the seemingly arbitrary nature of anti-media acts, when unaccom-
panied by increases in taboo material, led activists to initiate more mass 
actions during the 10-day period beginning in the subsequent month.39  
According to these models, when the government conceded to pro-
testers’ demands, subsequent protests increased, supporting a demon-
stration effect, although the variable only reaches statistical significance 
in some models. Repression against participants in mass actions had no 
statistically significant relationship to subsequent protest.  
Columns 2 and 3, which include controls for economic conditions, 
offer mixed support for the assertion that people respond to material 
grievances. The positive coefficient for monthly inflation indicates that 
high inflation motivates protest. However, the inclusion of period dum-
mies for AI-5 and after party reform causes inflation to lose statistical 
significance. Since monthly inflation was unavailable at the beginning of 
1974, I dropped inflation from subsequent models; the n increases slight-
ly and the findings remain consistent. Annual growth in GDP per capita 
was negatively correlated with subsequent protests, as one might expect, 
but only becomes statistically significant with the inclusion of the period 
dummies reported in column 3. Both period dummies had statistically 
significant negative coefficients, indicating that fewer mass actions oc-
curred during AI-5 and when Brazil reverted to multipartism.  
Column 4 incorporates three variables meant to capture potential 
government signals. While acts of political liberalization had no statisti-
cally significant relationship with subsequent protest, government repres-
sion of opposition members motivated increases in subsequent protest.  
As mentioned previously, the media’s barometer effect should di-
minish after the government ended censorship and largely ceased its 
intimidation and repression of journalists. To better grasp this distinc-
                                                 
39  The lag between the dependent variable and independent variables was precise-
ly 30 days, which I refer to as a month in the discussion. 
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tion, I ran the model specifications presented in columns 1 and 4, but 
divided the data into two periods: pre-party reform (see Table 1, col-
umns 5 & 6) and post-party reform (see Table 1, columns 7 & 8).40 In 
order to break up the opposition party, which had gained substantial 
ground in the two prior elections, the government instituted party re-
form in November 1979, a little more than a year after the end of prior 
censorship and 10 months after the end of the Fifth Institutional Act. 
Although party reform did weaken the sanctioned opposition party, it 
also offered new venues for people who sympathized with the opposi-
tion to express their grievances through the government’s formal institu-
tional system rather than taking to the streets in protest. Lifting censor-
ship also evened the playing field as mainstream newspapers covered 
more of the oppositions’ efforts. 
The model that focused on the pre-party reform period (columns 5 
& 6), from January 1974 through October 1979, accentuates the “ba-
rometer effect” of the media. The coefficients for lagged taboo content 
remain positive and increase in magnitude. The negative coefficients for 
the interaction between taboo coverage and both anti-media acts and 
journalist attacks lend further support to the theory that media–state 
relations serve as a barometer for opposition leaders planning mass ac-
tions. During this period, government concessions led to the increased 
initiation of mass actions the following month. 
In the period following party reform (columns 7 & 8), from No-
vember 1979 through December 1982, few variables have a statistically 
significant relationship with subsequent protests. The interaction of 
taboo content and anti-media acts still corresponds to a decline in subse-
quent protest when both variables increase simultaneously; however, it 
only reaches statistical significance at the 0.90-level and only with addi-
tional controls. The sign for government concessions, which previously 
was positive, becomes negative and is statistically significant. This indi-
cates that in the latter period the level of subsequent protests declined 
after the government granted concessions. Perhaps concessions no long-
er demonstrated their usefulness, but rather appeased active protestors’ 
demands. 
To offer a more informative way to interpret the model presented 
above, Figure 2 depicts the interacting effect of shifts in taboo content 
and anti-media actions at ti-3 on the expected number of mass actions for 
the 10-day period, ti, when the changes occur either in isolation or simul-
                                                 
40  This eliminates the need for period dummy variables. Results hold using AI-5 
and post-AI-5 as the divider rather two periods.  
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taneously. To generate Figure 2, I set the other variables to their means 
(except for the interaction terms that must be adjusted in accordance 
with taboo content; see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006) and I set the 
dummy variables to the period of AI-5.41 I excluded combinations of 
values for anti-media acts and taboo content that were unlikely to have 
occurred as indicated by the sample data.  
Figure 2. Expected Number of Mass Actions during ti  
 
 
The top panel in Figure 2 demonstrates that holding anti-media actions 
at zero, increasing taboo content corresponds to an increasing number 
of expected mass actions the following month. The middle panel illus-
trates the independent effect that the government’s anti-media actions 
have on the expectation of subsequent protests in the absence of taboo 
content. The bottom panel of Figure 2 depicts the “barometer effect”; 
                                                 
41  See Table 3 in the online appendix for summary statistics of the variables used 
in the statistical models. 
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when taboo content increases and the government also sanctions the 
media (moving toward the top right of the graph’s floor), fewer subse-
quent protests are expected to occur, supporting the proposition that 
opposition leaders interpret the co-occurrence of taboo coverage and 
anti-media acts as a sign of the government’s intolerance of public dis-
sent. 
6.1 Assessing the Alternative Explanations 
In order to determine whether the media lead the way in challenging the 
regime or take cues from the success or failure of activists’ public oppo-
sition, I present various specifications of a model with taboo content at ti 
as the dependent variable and anti-government mass actions and the 
government response to those actions for the 10-day period ti-1 as the key 
independent variable. I used a shorter lag because journalists are less 
dependent on coordinating their actions with others and can react quick-
ly to signals of risk. I test the model using the full time period and bro-
ken down by periods relative to party reform. If the alternative explana-
tion were correct, taboo content should increase following increases in 
mass action, particularly when these actions win concessions and do not 
meet repression, in which case journalists should avoid contentious con-
tent. I include interaction terms between Mass Actions x Concessions 
and Mass Actions x Repression (protest-specific) at ti-1. These interac-
tions capture the degree of concessions or use of repression relative to 
the number of protest events, respectively. For example, as the ratio of 
concessions to mass actions increases, it indicates an increasing likeli-
hood that the regime would grant concessions in response to a protest. 
As the results in Table 2 show, the coefficient for mass actions at ti-1 
indicates a positive relationship with subsequent taboo content, but only 
achieves statistical significance at the 0.05-level for the models covering 
the full period of time (columns 1 to 3); this provides weak support for 
the predicted outcome of AH1. The coefficients for the interaction be-
tween mass actions and government concessions, while statistically sig-
nificant across the models, are in the opposite direction predicted by the 
second implication (AH2) of this explanation. When the degree of con-
cessions relative to the number of protests increases, the model predicts 
the publication of fewer taboo stories in the subsequent coded issue of 
the paper; perhaps because this generates good will toward the regime. 
The government’s repression of protestors showed limited influence on 
journalists’ willingness to challenge the regime. 
The models do not offer strong support that journalists heeded cues 
from repressive government actions against other members of the oppo-
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sition; the coefficients for opposition repression only reach statistical 
significance at the 0.10 level. Given that journalists communicated 
among themselves and worked directly with government censors, they 
had little need to rely on activists for cues. Columns 4 and 5 and col-
umns 6 and 7 report a basic and an expanded model testing the reverse 
causal relationship, broken down by pre- and post-party reform periods, 
respectively.  
Table 2.  How Government Treatment of Anti-Government Mass Actions 
Influences Subsequent Media Coverage 
 1974-1982 
DV= No. of Stories on Taboo Subjects at t 1 2 3 
Taboo Content ni-1 0.147 *** 0.105 *** 0.101 *** 
  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.019)  
Mass Actions ti-1 0.075 *** 0.080 *** 0.077 ** 
  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.023)  
Anti-Media Acts ti-1 0.134  0.143  0.163 † 
  (0.112)  (0.111)  (0.094)  
Journalist Attacks ni-1 0.101  0.055  0.088  
  (0.070)  (0.048)  (0.059)  
Taboo Content ni-1 x Anti-Media Acts ti-1 -0.006  0.002  0.005  
  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.020)  
Taboo Content ni-1 x Journalist Attacks ni-1 -0.021 † -0.011  -0.018  
  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.012)  
Concessions ti-1 0.909 *** 0.901 *** 0.753 ** 
(protest-specific) (0.217)  (0.245)  (0.280)  
Repression ti-1 0.152  0.122  0.081  
(protest-specific) (0.115)  (0.097)  (0.129)  
Mass Actions ti-1 x Concessions ti-1 -0.095 *** -0.093 *** -0.078 ** 
(protest-specific) (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.029)  
Mass Actions ti-1 x Repression ti-1 -0.037 † -0.037 * -0.038 † 
(protest-specific) (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.022)  
Monthly Inflation Rate ti-1 —  0.119 *** 0.067 * 
(São Paulo municipality)   (0.027)  (0.034)  
GDP/capita growth, annual —  -0.029  -0.027 * 
    (0.011)  (0.012)  
Fifth-Institutional Act (AI-5) —  —  -0.557 ** 
      (0.181)  
Post-Party Reform  —  —  -0.231  
(Multiparty System)     (0.190)  
Political Liberalization ti-1 —  —  0.008  
      (0.016)  
Opposition Repression ti-1 —  —  0.005  
(excluding journalists)     (0.007)  
Opposition Repression ti-12 —  —  0.000  
(excluding journalists)     (0.000)  
Observations 322  316  313  
Wald Chi2 178.56 *** 225.45 *** 245.98 *** 
Log Pseudolikelihood -661.403 *** -638.42 *** -626.64 *** 
 
  
  132 Elizabeth Ann Stein 
 
 Pre-Party Reform Post-Party Reform
DV= No. of Stories on 
Taboo Subjects at t 
4 5 6 7 
Taboo Content ni-1 0.239 *** 0.159 *** 0.079 *** 0.080 *** 
  (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.020)  (0.020)  
Mass Actions ti-1 0.040  0.043 † 0.063  0.049  
  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.045)  (0.045)  
Anti-Media Acts ti-1 0.225  0.175  0.219  0.178  
  (0.139)  (0.114)  (0.190)  (0.208)  
Journalist Attacks ni-1 0.074  -0.025  0.291 * 0.269 * 
  (0.058)  (0.064)  (0.117)  (0.116)  
Taboo Content ni-1 x  
Anti-Media Acts ti-1 
-0.055  -0.044  -0.002  0.014  
  (0.034)  (0.031)  (0.022)  (0.023)  
Taboo Content ni-1 x 
Journalist Attacks ni-1 
-0.025 † -0.002  -0.037 * -0.035 * 
  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.016)  
Concessions ti-1 2.044 *** 1.819 *** 0.817 * 0.804 * 
(protest-specific) (0.316)  (0.328)  (0.350)  (0.346)  
Repression ti-1 0.147  0.138  -0.155  -0.093  
(protest-specific) (0.105)  (0.118)  (0.303)  (0.314)  
Mass Actions ti-1 x  
Concessions ti-1 
-0.201 *** -0.180 *** -0.149 * -0.140 * 
(protest-specific) (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.065)  (0.066)  
Mass Actions ti-1 x  
Repression ti-1 
-0.012  -0.018  0.004  -0.007  
(protest-specific) (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.045)  (0.043)  
Monthly Inflation Rate ti-1 —  0.132 ** —  0.043  
(São Paulo  
municipality) 
  (0.051)    (0.044)  
GDP/capita growth, 
annual 
—  -0.148 *** —  0.001  
    (0.037)    (0.012)  
Fifth-Institutional Act  
(AI-5) 
—  —  —  —  
          
Post-Party Reform  —  —  —  —  
(Multiparty System)         
Political Liberalization ti-1 —  0.006  —  0.081  
    (0.010)    (0.078)  
Opposition Repression ti-1 —  0.0003  —  0.014  
(excluding journalists)   (0.012)    (0.009)  
Opposition Repression ti-12 —  0.00002  —  -0.0001 *** 
(excluding journalists)   (0.0001)    (0.0001)  
Observations 206  197  116  116  
Wald Chi2 209.99 *** 212.65 *** 52.55  100.44  
Log Pseudolikelihood -358.61 *** -335.43 *** -273.82 *** -271.34 *** 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p  0.001; ** p  0.010; * p  0.050; 
† p  0.100. Constants were included, but are not reported here. In all models, 
likelihood ratio tests of alpha=0, run on equivalent models without robust s.e., 
produce statistically significant Chi2 that indicate overdispersed data; negative 
binomial rather than Poisson is appropriate. 
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Based on the results in Tables 1 and 2, I believe the media reacted to 
political and economic conditions, rather than taking cues from opposi-
tion activists. Activists, on the contrary, appear to have observed media–
state relations in planning anti-government mass actions, even if just to 
validate any signals they received directly from government actions that 
implied the regime’s increased tolerance for public dissent. Neither mod-
el strongly supports the third alternative hypothesis (AH3), in which 
media and mass opposition leaders react independently to the same fac-
tors when assessing risk. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper I proposed that activist leaders in authoritarian regimes, 
who aim to encourage greater participation among the masses, must rely 
on indirect sources of information in order to gauge the level of risk of 
participation in mass political actions. The data coded from the content 
of the Folha de São Paulo revealed that the information the media provid-
ed extended beyond the news they covered. When journalists and editors 
offered more critical coverage, publishing content that previously was 
considered taboo, they forced the government to decide whether to 
suppress, repress or ignore these challenges. In making these decisions, 
the government revealed its tolerance for anti-regime expression and/or 
its ability to combat these challenges. In line with the expectation that 
the media serve as the opposition’s “barometer” of the regime’s disposi-
tion, opposition leaders in Brazil tended to initiate more mass actions 
following successful challenges by the media (that is, when the press 
published more taboo coverage while suffering few, if any, repercussions 
for its actions).  
The relationship in which the media help guide activists in planning 
their opposition tactics should interest scholars and policymakers inter-
ested in democratization and democratic consolidation. With reduced 
oversight from the media, politicians remain less accountable to the 
public and can co-opt or coerce other actors, such as the police or 
courts, who might otherwise offer the opposition protection. If state-
sponsored repression increases, leaders of the opposition may turn to-
ward the media to test the waters for government tolerance of public 
dissent before encouraging their supporters to take to the street for anti-
government protests.  
The findings in this paper suggest that supporting the development 
of a free and diverse media environment is essential to democratization 
and the sustenance of liberal democracy. By encouraging journalists to 
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challenge government – and protecting those who do – media can in-
form citizens of government policy and actions. This information can 
improve the planning of and thus participation in mass opposition ac-
tions, which in the case of contemporary Latin America may prevent 
further democratic backsliding. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. List of Interviews 
Zilah Abramo 7 December 2004 São Paulo Wife of Journalist Perseu 
Abramo 
Geraldo Alckmin 2 May 2007 Cambridge, 
Mass. 
Member of the MDB, 
Mayor 
Elifas Andreato 31 January 2005 São Paulo Graphic Designer/ 
Activist 
Maurício Azêdo 25 November 2004 Rio de Janeiro Journalist, communist 
party member 
Carlos Azevedo 2 February 2005 São Paulo Journalist/Activist 
Ricardo Azevedo 7 December 2004 São Paulo Activist 
Hermann Baeta Exact date un-
known 
Rio de Janeiro Lawyer/President of 
OAB 
Mino Carta 31 January 2005 São Paulo Journalist/Editor, Veja, 
IstoÉ, Carta Capital  
Carlúcio Castanha 3 March 2005 Recife, Pernam-
buco 
Metalworker/Activist 
Jonicael Cedraz 
de Oliveira 
28 February 2005 Salvador, Bahía Student activist 
Audálio Dantas 2 February 2005 São Paulo Journalist/Journalists’ 
union president 
A. C. Fon 1 February 2005 São Paulo Journalist/Activist, armed 
organization 
Fernando Gaspa-
rian 
29 January 2005 Rio de Janeiro Media owner, Founder 
Pasquím/Opinião 
Vito Gianotti Dec. 2004 (exact 
date unknown) 
Rio de Janeiro Union organizer/ Journa-
list 
Carlos Alberto 
Lobão 
10 December 2004 Campinas, São 
Paulo 
Activist 
Dulce Maia 20-21 January 2005 Cunha, São 
Paulo 
Activist 
Frederico Maz-
zucchelli 
7 December 2004 São Paulo Activist 
Marcelo Mário de 
Melo 
2 March 2005 Recife, São 
Paulo 
Journalist/Activist 
Luiz Momesso 3 March 2005 São Paulo Journalist/Union Activist 
Raimundo Pereira 14 December 2004 São Paulo Editor/Activist, Founder 
Opinião/Movimento 
Reinaldo Morano 
Filho 
2 February 2005 São Paulo Activist, armed organiza-
tion 
Rose Nogueira 2 February 2005 São Paulo Journalist/Activist 
Father Agostinho 
Pretto 
Exact date 
unknown 
Nova Iguaçu, 
Rio de Janeiro 
Priest, Juventude Operá-
ria Católica 
Gustavo Zim-
mermann 
7 December 2004 Campinas, São 
Paulo 
Student activist 
Note:  This list includes all interviews I carried out during fieldwork in Brazil during the 
2004-2005 U.S. academic year. I do not cite all of these interviews in this arti-
cle. I translated these articles from Portuguese with the help of a Brazilian re-
search assistant. If any meaning was lost or misinterpreted in the translation, I 
am to blame. 
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Table A2. Summary of Variables Used in Models in Table 1 
 1974-1982 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Mass Actions during ti 1.76 3.15 0 37 
Mass Actions during ti-3 1.78 3.18 0 37 
Taboo Content in issue ni-3 3.01 3.12 0 18 
Anti-Media Acts during ti-3 0.35 0.71 0 5 
Journalist Attacks in issue ni-3 0.40 1.36 0 13 
(Taboo Content X Anti-Media Acts) during ti-3 1.18 3.20 0 30 
Taboo Content during ti-3 X Journalist Attacks in ni-3 1.49 6.18 0 48 
Concessions, ti-3 (protest-specific) 0.10 0.66 0 11 
Repression, ti-3 (protest-specific) 0.25 0.64 0 4 
Monthly Inflation Rate (SP), ti-3 3.89 1.98 0.35 9.08 
GDP/capita growth, annual 2.37 4.26 -6.6 7.2 
Acts of Political Liberalization in issue i at t-3  0.60 3.00 0 41 
Opposition Repression in issue i at t-3  6.91 21.45 0 160 
 
 Pre-Party Reform 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Mass Actions during ti 1.59 3.53 0 37 
Mass Actions during ti-3 1.58 3.56 0 37 
Taboo Content in issue ni-3 2.13 2.50 0 13 
Anti-Media Acts during ti-3 0.37 0.75 0 5 
Journalist Attacks in issue ni-3 0.46 1.53 0 13 
(Taboo Content X Anti-Media Acts) during ti-3 0.98 2.56 0 18 
Taboo Content during ti-3 X Journalist Attacks in ni-3 1.60 6.34 0 48 
Concessions, ti-3 (protest-specific) 0.09 0.78 0 11 
Repression, ti-3 (protest-specific) 0.23 0.63 0 4 
Monthly Inflation Rate (SP), ti-3 3.87 2.32 0.8 7.2 
GDP/capita growth, annual 2.89 1.47 0.35 6.36 
Acts of Political Liberalization in issue i at t-3  0.71 3.46 0 41 
Opposition Repression in issue i at t-3  6.67 20.92 0 160 
 
 Post-Party Reform 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Mass Actions during ti 2.07 2.29 0 16 
Mass Actions during ti-3 2.13 2.30 0 16 
Taboo Content in issue ni-3 4.59 3.49 0 18 
Anti-Media Acts during ti-3 0.31 0.62 0 3 
Journalist Attacks in issue ni-3 0.28 0.98 0 6 
(Taboo Content X Anti-Media Acts) during ti-3 1.53 4.10 0 30 
Taboo Content during ti-3 X Journalist Attacks in ni-3 1.29 5.92 0 48 
Concessions, ti-3 (protest-specific) 0.12 0.33 0 2 
Repression, ti-3 (protest-specific) 0.30 0.66 0 3.5 
Monthly Inflation Rate (SP), ti-3 -0.31 5.46 -6.6 6.6 
GDP/capita growth, annual 5.62 1.50 3.14 9.08 
Acts of Political Liberalization in issue i at t-3  0.41 1.94 0 17 
Opposition Repression in issue i at t-3  7.35 22.46 0 159 
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Table A3. Summary of Variables Used in Models in Table 2 
  1974-1982 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Taboo Content in issue ni 2.99 3.11 0 18 
Mass Actions during ti-1 1.78 3.17 0 37 
Taboo Content in issue ni-1 2.99 3.12 0 18 
Anti-Media Acts during ti-1 0.34 0.71 0 5 
Journalist Attacks in issue ni-1 0.39 1.35 0 13 
(Taboo Content X Anti-Media Acts) during ti-1 1.17 3.19 0 30 
Taboo Content during ti-1 X Journalist Attacks in ni-1 1.48 6.16 0 48 
Concessions during ti-1 (protest-specific) 0.10 0.66 0 11 
Repression during ti-1 (protest-specific) 0.25 0.64 0 4 
Monthly Inflation Rate (SP), ti-1 0.69 6.35 0 110 
GDP/capita growth, annual 1.32 4.80 0 40 
(Mass Actions X Concessions) during ti-1 2.40 4.26 -6.6 7.2 
(Mass Actions X Repression) during ti-1 3.92 2.00 0.35 9.08 
Acts of Political Liberalization in issue ni-1 0.59 2.99 0 41 
Opposition Repression in issue ni-1 6.87 21.39 0 160 
 
 Pre-Party Reform 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Taboo Content in issue ni 2.18 2.53 0 13 
Mass Actions during ti-1 1.60 3.55 0 37 
Taboo Content in issue ni-1 2.17 2.54 0 13 
Anti-Media Acts during ti-1 0.36 0.75 0 5 
Journalist Attacks in issue ni-1 0.45 1.52 0 13 
(Taboo Content X Anti-Media Acts) during ti-1 0.97 2.55 0 18 
Taboo Content during ti-1 X Journalist Attacks in ni-1 1.59 6.31 0 48 
Concessions during ti-1 (protest-specific) 0.09 0.78 0 11 
Repression during ti-1 (protest-specific) 0.22 0.63 0 4 
Monthly Inflation Rate (SP), ti-1 0.74 7.69 0 110 
GDP/capita growth, annual 1.26 4.57 0 37 
(Mass Actions X Concessions) during ti-1 2.92 1.49 0.35 6.36 
(Mass Actions X Repression) during ti-1 3.90 2.32 0.8 7.2 
Acts of Political Liberalization in issue ni-1 0.83 3.68 0 41 
Opposition Repression in issue ni-1 6.60 20.83 0 160 
 
 Post-Party Reform 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Taboo Content in issue ni 4.45 3.52 0 18 
Mass Actions during ti-1 2.09 2.29 0 16 
Taboo Content in issue ni-1 4.47 3.51 0 18 
Anti-Media Acts during ti-1 0.31 0.62 0 3 
Journalist Attacks in issue ni-1 0.28 0.98 0 6 
(Taboo Content X Anti-Media Acts) during ti-1 1.53 4.10 0 30 
Taboo Content during ti-1 X Journalist Attacks in ni-1 1.29 5.92 0 48 
Concessions during ti-1 (protest-specific) 0.12 0.33 0 2 
Repression during ti-1 (protest-specific) 0.30 0.66 0 3.5 
Monthly Inflation Rate (SP), ti-1 0.59 2.60 0 24 
GDP/capita growth, annual 1.43 5.20 0 40 
(Mass Actions X Concessions) during ti-1 5.66 1.53 3.14 9.08 
(Mass Actions X Repression) during ti-1 -0.31 5.46 -6.6 6.6 
Acts of Political Liberalization in issue ni-1 0.17 0.71 0 6 
Opposition Repression in issue ni-1 7.35 22.46 0 159 
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Censurando a Imprensa: Um Barómetro de Tolerância Governa-
mental à Dissidências Políticas sob Regimes Autoritários  
Resumo: Este artigo42 propõe que líderes políticos dissidentes que alme-
jam estruturar movimentos de oposição em massa acompanham a im-
prensa ordinária de modo a contribuir com a avaliação da tolerância 
governamental à manifestações populares contra o Governo, em regimes 
autoritários repressivos. Sob condições de censura, as interações mídia-
Estado servem como um barômetro da capacidade e disposição do Go-
verno em impedir manifestações públicas oriundas de setores da oposi-
ção. As reportagens jornalísticas e as reações do Governo às mesmas são 
fontes que auxiliam os líderes opositores à avaliarem o momento mais 
prudente para planejar ações de massa antagônicas ao regime, tais como 
manifestações, marchas, e greves. A partir de dados originais derivados 
da codificação de conteúdo do jornal brasileiro Folha de São Paulo no 
período entre 1974–1982, examino se as ações populares da oposição 
acompanharam os padrões de conteúdo censurado, bem como o trata-
mento que o Governo deu à imprensa durante o período da redemocra-
tização do Brasil, no fim do regime militar. 
Palavras chaves: Brasil, autoritarismo, censura, sociedade civil, ações 
populares, protesto, manifestações, regime militar 
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Censoring the Press: A Barometer of 
Government Tolerance for Anti-
regime Dissent under Authoritarian 
Rule 
Elizabeth Ann Stein 
Abstract: This paper proposes that dissident leaders aiming to 
build mass opposition movements follow the mainstream press to 
help them gauge government tolerance for anti-government mass 
actions in repressive authoritarian regimes. Under conditions of 
censorship, media–state interactions serve as a barometer of the 
government’s disposition toward and capacity to impede public 
displays of dissent. Observing trends in coverage and the gov-
ernment’s reaction to this coverage helps activist leaders assess 
when it should be safest to plan anti-government mass actions, 
such as demonstrations, marches, or strikes. Using original data 
derived from coding content from the Brazilian newspaper Folha 
de São Paulo over the period of 1974–1982, I test whether opposi-
tion mass actions followed trends in taboo content and govern-
ment treatment of the press during the period of political liberali-
zation of Brazil’s military regime. 
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Table A4. Media Coverage and Government Censorship/Repression Ef-
fects on Mass Actions, Alternative Specifications (Negative Bi-
nomial Regression with Lagged Dependent Variable) 
 1974-1978 
DV = Mass Actions during ti App. 1 App. 2 
Mass Actions during ti-3 0.122 * 0.120 * 
  (0.054) (0.056) 
Taboo Content in issue ni-3 0.096 * 0.107 ** 
  (0.039) (0.040) 
Anti-Media Acts during ti-3 0.451 † 0.540 * 
  (0.231) (0.235) 
Journalist Attacks in issue ni-3 0.109 0.130 † 
  (0.075) (0.079) 
Taboo Content in ni-3 X Anti-Media 
Acts during ti-3 
-0.101 * -0.122 ** 
  (0.042) (0.047) 
Taboo Content in ni-3 X Journalist 
Attacks in ni-3  
-0.031 † -0.039 * 
  (0.016) (0.017) 
Concessions during ti-3 0.120 † 0.153 * 
(protest-specific) (0.061) (0.066) 
Repression during ti-3 0.160 0.118 
(protest-specific) (0.123) (0.145) 
Acts of Political Liberalization in 
issue ni-3  
—  0.060  
  (0.050) 
Opposition Repression in issue ni-3 — 0.011 ** 
(excluding journalists) (0.004) 
Opposition Repression2 in issue ni-3 — 0.00004 
(excluding journalists) (0.00004) 
President Médici -21.941 *** -20.193 *** 
(relative to President Figueiredo) (0.614) (0.621) 
President Geisel -0.655 *** -0.744 *** 
(relative to President Figueiredo) (0.190) (0.195) 
Observations 322 316 
Wald Chi2 1466.41 1254.75 
Log Pseudolikelihood -531.74 *** -514.36 *** 
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Table A5. Media Coverage and Government Censorship/Repression Ef-
fects on Mass Actions, Alternative Specifications (Negative Bi-
nomial Regression with Lagged Dependent Variable) 
 AI-5 Post AI-5 
DV = Mass Actions during 
ti 
App. 3 App. 4 App. 5 App. 6 
Mass Actions during ti-3 0.141 0.105 0.103 * 0.104 * 
  (0.135) (0.111) (0.042) (0.044) 
Taboo Content in issue ni-3 0.305 ** 0.368 ** 0.004 0.004 
  (0.100) (0.119) (0.028) (0.029) 
Anti-Media Acts during ti-3 0.481 * 0.691 ** 0.134 0.261 
  (0.229) (0.235) (0.216) (0.240) 
Journalist Attacks in issue 
ni-3 0.333 * 0.414 * -0.055  -0.036  
  (0.141) (0.170) (0.071) (0.072) 
Taboo Content in ni-3 X 
Anti-Media Acts during ti-3 -0.253 * -0.268 * -0.042  -0.088 † 
  (0.102) (0.117) (0.034) (0.047) 
Taboo Content in ni-3 X 
Journalist Attacks in ni-3  -0.113 * -0.147 ** 0.013  0.011  
  (0.049) (0.056) (0.015) (0.016) 
Concessions during ti-3 0.289 * 0.342 ** -0.625 ** -0.612 ** 
(protest-specific) (0.117) (0.115) (0.240) (0.236) 
Repression during ti-3 0.266 0.248 0.090 0.059 
(protest-specific) (0.259) (0.221) (0.149) (0.175) 
Acts of Political Liberaliza-
tion in issue ni-3  —  0.161 *** —  -0.005  
  (0.042) (0.013) 
Opposition Repression in 
issue ni-3  —  0.023 *** —  0.003  
(excluding journalists) (0.007) (0.002) 
Opposition Repression2 in 
issue ni-3  —  0.0001  —  0.0001 * 
(excluding journalists) (0.0001) (0.00003) 
Observations 177 174 145 142 
Wald Chi2 50.73 82.58 30.51 39.53 
Log Pseudolikelihood -212.25 *** -200.09 *** -290.36 *** -282.44 *** 
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Table A6. Mass Actions and Government Repression of Opposition Effects 
on Taboo Media Coverage, Alternative Specifications (Negative 
Binomial Regression with Lagged Dependent Variable) 
  1974-1982 
DV= Taboo Content in issue ni App. A1 App. A2 
Taboo Content in issue ni-1 0.111 *** 0.110 *** 
  (0.019) (0.019) 
Mass Actions during ti-1 0.074 *** 0.076 *** 
  (0.019) (0.020) 
Anti-Media Acts during ti-1 0.162 0.159 
  (0.110) (0.109) 
Journalist Attacks in issue ni-1 0.104 † 0.113 † 
  (0.055) (0.060) 
Taboo Content during ti-1 X Anti-
Media Acts during ti-1 
-0.003  0.001  
  (0.017) (0.016) 
Taboo Content during ti-1 X Journalist 
Attacks in issue ni-1 
-0.018 † -0.020 † 
  (0.010) (0.011) 
Concessions during ti-1 0.692 *** 0.682 *** 
(protest-specific) (0.203) (0.206) 
Repression during ti-1 0.099 0.115 
(protest-specific) (0.103) (0.114) 
Mass Actions X Concessions during ti-1 -0.071 *** -0.070 *** 
(protest-specific) (0.020) (0.020) 
Mass Actions X Repression during ti-1 -0.036 * -0.040 * 
(protest-specific) (0.018) (0.019) 
Acts of Political Liberalization in issue 
ni-1  
—  0.012  
  (0.014) 
Opposition Repression in issue ni-1 — 0.005 
(excluding journalists) (0.007) 
Opposition Repression2 in issue ni-1 — -0.0001 
(excluding journalists) (0.00005)
President Médici -2.372 ** -2.349 ** 
(relative to President Figueiredo) (0.873) (0.875) 
President Geisel -0.586 *** -0.582 *** 
(relative to President Figueiredo) (0.109) (0.108) 
Observations 322 319.000 
Wald Chi2 214.11 220.790 
Log pseudolikelihood -642.60 *** -635.790 *** 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p  0.001; ** p  0.010; * p  0.050; 
† p  0.100. Constants were included but are not reported here. In all models 
likelihood ratio tests of alpha = 0, run on equivalent models without robust 
standard errors, indicate that the data are overdispersed and therefore the 
negative binomial distribution, rather than the Poisson distribution is appropri-
ate. 
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Table A7. Mass Actions & Government Repression of Opposition Effects 
on Taboo Media Coverage, Alternative Specifications (Negative 
Binomial Regression with Lagged Dependent Variable) 
  AI-5 Post AI-5 
DV= Taboo Content in 
issue ni 
App. A3 App. A4 App. A5 App. A6 
Taboo Content in issue ni-
1 0.253 *** 0.241 *** 0.079 *** 0.078 *** 
  (0.048) (0.049) (0.017) (0.018) 
Mass Actions during ti-1 0.056 0.059 0.051 † 0.054 † 
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.028) (0.029) 
Anti-Media Acts during ti-1 0.291 † 0.298 * 0.188 0.135 
  (0.150) (0.151) (0.178) (0.187) 
Journalist Attacks in issue 
ni-1 0.028  -0.006  0.283 ** 0.266 ** 
  (0.101) (0.117) (0.094) (0.097) 
Taboo Content in ni-1 X 
Anti-Media Acts during ti-1 -0.072 † -0.065 † 0.000  0.013  
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.021) (0.020) 
Taboo Content in ni-1 X 
Journalist Attacks in ni-1 -0.006  0.001  -0.033 ** -0.031 * 
  (0.029) (0.032) (0.012) (0.012) 
Concessions during ti-1 1.881 *** 1.978 *** 0.905 *** 0.834 ** 
(protest-specific) (0.401) (0.394) (0.256) (0.266) 
Repression during ti--1 0.180 0.133 -0.206 -0.108 
(protest-specific) (0.133) (0.144) (0.198) (0.216) 
(Mass Actions X Conces-
sions) during ti-1  -0.186 *** -0.196 *** -0.137 ** -0.128 ** 
(protest-specific) (0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.047) 
(Mass Actions X Repres-
sion) during ti-1 -0.033  -0.032  0.005  -0.013  
(protest-specific) (0.043) (0.042) (0.027) (0.029) 
Acts of Political Liberali-
zation in issue i at t-1  —  0.058  —  0.005  
  (0.039) (0.009) 
Opposition Repression in 
issue ni-1 —  0.006  —  0.011  
(excluding journalists) (0.013) (0.008) 
Opposition Repression2 in 
issue ni-1 —  -0.00002  —  -0.0001 * 
(excluding journalists) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Observations 177 177 145 142 
Wald Chi2 184.30 221.180 67.19 108.14 
Log pseudolikelihood -289.62 *** -287.900 -337.22 *** -329.51 *** 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p  0.001; ** p  0.010; * p  0.050; 
† p  0.100. Constants were included but are not reported here. In all models 
likelihood ratio tests of alpha = 0, run on equivalent models without robust 
standard errors, indicate that the data are overdispersed and therefore the 
negative binomial distribution, rather than the Poisson distribution is appropri-
ate. 
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Sample Coding Sheet with Coding Rules 
First Page Headline: 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
First, choose the biggest headline. If two headlines are of equal size, pick the one 
closest to the top, left corner 
What photos appear above the 
fold?______________________________________________________________________ 
Describe all photos that are fully above the fold. Only include photos that overlap the 
fold if the reader could make out the primary subject of the photo from above the fold. 
Protest Information 
Is there a mention of a protest or strike?                       Yes __ No __  If so, 
what page(s)? _Page and section__ 
Include all mentions of protest or strikes that occurred at some point during the period 
of 1974-1984, regardless of whether they are immediate reports or not. However, note 
below when the actual strike or protest occurred, particularly if it was some time prior to 
the report your are reading. Circle “protest” or “strike” to indicate which or circle both 
if you read about both. Do not include hunger strikes here, place them under other anti-
government activities below. 
Were other anti-government activities reported? Yes __ No __ If so, 
what page(s)? Page and section 
If yes, Describe?_____________________________________________________________ 
This includes activities from kidnappings to open letters to the press, government, etc. I 
imagine there are many things that fall into this category that we will only think of as we 
read them. The government should be considered the military, Arena, and only the 
MDB if it is also against Arena or if it’s clearly anti-status quo. For example if the MDB 
sides with Arena on an important policy and is then attacked, this would count. It 
should be against the higher levels of government. 
If there are mentions of protests/strikes, answer the following questions, otherwise leave them blank. 
How many protests do they mention? __________How many strikes do they mention? 
__________ 
How large was the first protest/strike? _______The second protest/strike? _______The third 
protest/strike? _______ 
(Write (N/A) if the article doesn’t mention the size of the strike) 
Was the protest pro- or anti-government?                 Pro __ Anti __ Can’t Tell __ 
If there are multiple strikes and or protests, answer these questions for the first one 
here, and then answer them for subsequent ones below under notes. Rather than write 
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on the back, use a duplicate piece of a paper, if needed and write 1 of 2 or 2 of 2 on the 
bottom (This will help when making copies later). Though the questions are geared 
more toward protests, answer as best you can for strikes, too. 
What were the protestors demanding?  1) ______________________________________ 
 2) ______________________________________ 
 3) ______________________________________ 
Only fill this in if it is explicitly stated in the article or is evident from an accompanying 
photo. 
Do they mention the government response to the protest? Yes __
 No __  
If they specifically mention that the government’s response was to do nothing you 
should mark “yes” above and write “nothing” or “no reaction” below. If they don’t 
mention the government’s response than check “no.” 
If so, what was the government’s re-
sponse?____________________________________________________________ 
Was anyone injured in the protest? Yes __ No __
 No mention __ 
If you check “no mention” above, then you should mark “N/A” for all questions below. 
Only check “no” if the report specifically mentions that no one was hurt in the pro-
test/strike 
If yes, did the police or military cause these injuries? Yes __ No __
 N/A __ 
Did counter protestors or paramilitary groups cause these injuries?  Yes __
 No __ N/A __ 
Did guerrilla or other leftist groups cause injuries to protestors? Yes __
 No __ N/A __ 
How many injuries were reported? ______________ (zero if specified, N/A if no mention) 
How many deaths were reported? ______________ (zero if specified, N/A if no mention) 
How many arrests were reported? ______________ (zero if specified, N/A if no mention) 
Include any other relevant information below that you think is worth remembering but 
does not answer a question above. Note the page, location, author, etc. of the article so 
that it can be found again if necessary. 
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Media Information 
Is there mention of injury, arrest, etc. to reporters or editors, activists, other?  Yes __
 No __ If so, what 
page? _________ 
This should include anyone that can be considered against the government, including 
Opposition politicians. The fact that they were arrested/injured implies that these 
politicians were more anti-regime than the Opposition more generally. Include trials, 
threats, kidnappings, etc. 
If so, which? Injury __, Arrest ___, Kidnapping ___, Death ___, or Other___  
If Other, specify__________________________ 
To whom?  Reporter ___, Editor ___, Activist ___, Other____  
If Other, specify__________________________  
Note below the person’s proper name, if given. 
Is there a literal mention of censorship?  Yes __ No __  Page____ Location:___ 
This should only include actual cases of censorship, not hypothetical cases or laws that 
may affect censorship. Please note to the right side what and/or who was censored and 
why, if a reason is provided. Also note when it occurred (in case it’s a historical refer-
ence). Don’t note cases outside the dictatorship 1964-1984. 
Is there a mention of confiscation?  Yes __ No __ Page____ Location:___ 
This should be any case where a publication has already been produced, or a program 
is fully ready to air and is then pulled from the shelves or the airwaves, usually at the last 
minute. Again, note what is being confiscated and why, and the date of confiscation.  
Is there a mention of media closure?  Yes __ No __  Page____ Location:___ 
This should include the closure of a publication due to government pressures/rulings 
(could occur through financial squeeze, but note this). Also, it could be suspension of 
licenses to broadcast for extended period of time, which differs from 1-time confisca-
tion. 
Is there a mention of intimidation?  Yes __ No __  Page____ Location:___ 
This should include explicit or implicit threats and other things that you come across 
but can’t specify now. Include who is intimidated, by whom and when. 
Is there a mention of a bombing? Yes __ No __ Page____ Location:___ 
This should be against the media or opposition groups. You should note the date of 
bombing, if it actually went off or was found before exploding, and who/what was 
bombed, and by whom. 
Other? Yes __ No __ Page____ Location:___ 
What? _______________ 
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This includes a multitude of things relating to the media or opposition that I can’t 
encompass in one of the other categories. 
Is there a report of an actual easing of media restrictions?  Yes __ No __   
Page____ Location:___ 
This should include any reduction in laws related to media restrictions and censorship. 
It should also include reduced application of laws and/or punishment of violations 
which have the effect of easing media restrictions. 
If yes, please specify __________________________________________________________ 
Is there a mention of the actual lifting of censorship? Yes __ No __ 
 Page____ Location:___  
If yes, of whom?____________ 
This should only relate to the repealing of a law or the full stop of its application to a 
particular person or publication. 
Is there a mention of a release of a journalist/editor? Yes __ No __ 
 Page____ Location:___  
If yes, of who?____________ 
State when they were released and if given when they were initially imprisoned and for 
what. This could also be a kidnapping, but if it is, please note this on the left side of the 
questions 
Is there a mention of a release of an opposition activist?  Yes __ No __ 
 Page____ Location:___  
If yes, of who?____________ 
This should include politicians who are imprisoned, etc. Follow instructions for above 
question. 
Evidence of Censorship 
Is there any evidence of censorship? Yes __  No __  
 Page____ Location:___ Type 
_____________ 
This should be specific evidence, not general issues of format. If you are unsure, mark it 
here and note that you are not sure and why. 
What form does it take? ____________________________________________________ 
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Specific Media Content  
 
Does the media mention…   
-1- economic failure/mismanagement?  Yes __ No __   
This should include cases where the government is explicitly criticized, the tone of the 
article indicates the government is criticized, or the government is criticized indirectly. 
For example, if the MDB’s gains are attributed to a fault with the economy, like high 
cost of living. This implies that the government is to blame for this. 
-2- government corruption?  Yes __ No __  
-3- crime by government officials?  Yes __ No __  
In these two cases, the government should be considered the highest levels of govern-
ment, anything at the Federal level, Governors, State senators and Deputies from the 
principal industrialized states, Mayors who are appointed and not elected. Crime should 
have been clearly committed not merely investigation of allegations (political maneu-
vers). 
-4- negative personal information on leader?  Yes __ No __  
This can be scandals involving the president’s family or personal scandals, discussion of 
health or anything that puts in doubt his ability to lead the country. 
-5- splits within ruling group?  Yes __ No __  
This should be among the military or Arena. It should be fairly explicit (Talk of two 
correntes, or one leader breaking off from the party in contestation of some government 
policy or political appointment. This can be at the Federal level or the level of important 
states. 
-6- quotes from opposition?  Yes __ No __  
This should only be the opposition that’s not sanctioned by the government. This 
should include members of the CNBB, UNE, ABI, OAB, Unions, PC do B, or PCB 
-7- electoral efforts by opposition?  Yes __ No __  
This should be a campaign for direct elections, more autonomy or fairness, the attempts 
to form additional opposition parties to contest elections (not just splits in Congress or 
sublegendas), etc. This is not just a national campaign by an MDB candidate 
-8- anti-government satire?  Yes __ No __  
This should actually appear in this edition of the paper. It should not be a reference to a 
past edition or to an arrest for satire. Do your best to pick these up. If you’re fairly 
certain but unsure, note this. If you’re utterly unsure if something is anti-government 
don’t check it. 
-9- criticism of government policy? Yes __ No __   
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This should be a specific government policy or body that doesn’t fall into the category 
of economic mismanagement. 
 
If need be, write on an additional piece of paper the descriptions below. Do not write on 
the back because I will not make copies of this later. 
Article 1  Content code _____  byline __________________ Page____ Loca-
tion:____  Type ____________ Reference or Focus  
Subject________________________________________________________________ 
Article 2  Content code _____  byline __________________ Page____ Loca-
tion:____  Type ____________ Reference or Focus  
Subject:_________________________________________________________________ 
Article 3  Content code _____  byline __________________ Page____ Loca-
tion:____  Type ____________ Reference or Focus  
Subject:___________________________________________________________________ 
Article 4  Content code _____  byline __________________ Page____ Loca-
tion:____  Type ____________ Reference or Focus  
Subject:___________________________________________________________________ 
Article 5  Content code _____  byline __________________ Page____ Loca-
tion:____  Type ____________ Reference or Focus  
Subject____________________________________________________________________ 
Article 6  Content code _____  byline __________________ Page____ Loca-
tion:____  Type ____________ Reference or Focus  
Subject:___________________________________________________________________ 
Article 7  Content code _____  byline __________________ Page____ Loca-
tion:____  Type ____________ Reference or Focus  
Subject:___________________________________________________________________ 
 
